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This curious image (fig. 1), from Lars von Trier’s Dancer in the Dark (2000), 
presents us with the familiar situation of sitting in the darkness of the cinema with our 
eyes oriented towards the screen. Kathy (Catherine Deneuve) and Selma (Björk) are 
watching one of the golden age Hollywood musicals. The scene arrives during 
Dancer in the Dark when the already-myopic Selma’s sight has begun its rapid 
deterioration – in the present frame, she is now almost blind. Kathy, to compensate 
for Selma’s inability to see the musical, allows her to feel it by acting out the Busby 
Berkeley dance number with her fingertips in Selma’s palm. Selma is experiencing 
the musical as there, on the screen, and here, in the palm of her hand. The scene 
therefore brings to the fore, in quite a literal manner, questions of the haptic and the 
role of the body in cinematic spectatorship. 1 It reminds us that we do not just watch 
films with our eyes, but that cinema requires a body. The image therefore offers a 
snapshot that allows one to see within a single frame why Dancer in the Dark, in a 
way that this article will go on to explore, offers us a critical re-vision of the musical. 
It can be seen to mark a theoretical point of intersection between Laura Marks’ 
concept of ‘haptic visuality’ and Richard Dyer’s claim from his 1977 essay 
Entertainment and Utopia, that musicals show us “what utopia would feel like”. 2 The 
fact it is a musical Selma and Kathy are watching, and that Dancer in the Dark too is 
its own kind of musical, raises new concerns for the way the musical, in some 
circumstances, might be thought about in terms of the haptic, and feeling, both 
physical and emotional, moving away from traditional readings that have typically 
theorised the musical in terms of visual spectacle.  
Though Dyer and Marks’ discussions stem from two different eras of film 
theory (one classical, the other contemporary) and speak about different cinemas 
(Hollywood entertainment in contrast to experimental and independent video and 
film), their dialogue is a productive one that gives us a new way of attending to and 
engaging with the musical and its development since its golden age.3 As I will argue, 
Dancer in the Dark bridges these theories by foregrounding the role of the non-
representational in thinking about utopia and feeling. In bringing together, at this 





the Dark is an important text for the way it allows us to think about the musical’s 
past, present and future from a haptic perspective, and also allows us to reread Dyer’s 
claim in light of new developments in film theory and scholarship. 
Set in Washington State in the mid-1960s, Dancer in the Dark tells the story 
of Selma Jezkova, an immigrant from Czechoslovakia who suffers from a genetic 
condition that will eventually leave her blind. She works long hours in a factory to 
save for her son’s eye operation, for he too will suffer her fate without this medical 
intervention, available only in the United States. Selma adores the golden age 
musicals, and, as her sight deteriorates, the viewer accompanies her into her aural 
world of hearing music in noise and imaginatively constructing colourful musicals 
from her bleak reality. As in the Hollywood musical, these episodes offer an escape 
from the brutal reality of the narrative world; Selma’s landlord and neighbour, police-
officer Bill (David Morse), takes advantage of Selma’s blindness and steals her 
money to conceal his own bankruptcy from his wife. Selma kills him (because he asks 
her to) while trying to prise her cash from his grip. The film consciously refuses to 
provide narrative clarity for why Bill begs Selma to kill him, but this event sets in 
motion a process through the American justice system where Selma is tried, found 
guilty and sentenced to death by hanging. It is a claustrophobic progress through a 
constrained narrative we know will yield no happy ending, and Selma’s execution 
forms the film’s final, harrowing scene. Dancer in the Dark is therefore a radically 
different kind of musical in both content and form that (like von Trier’s subsequent 
work Dogville) engages in a deep critique of American values, including its 
healthcare, legal, judicial and punitive systems.4 However, Dancer in the Dark poses 
specific questions concerning mimesis, the senses and intersubjectivity that leads the 
discussion towards new political concerns for the musical, through the film’s interest 
in issues of marginality and displacement.   
Marks defines haptic visuality as instances where “the eyes themselves 
function like organs of touch”.5 She argues that cinema appeals to senses other than 
the visual, that vision itself can be tactile and that images are, in fact, multi-sensory. 
Cinema’s haptic qualities, according to Marks, take over in representation where 
narrative and optical visuality fail. In her discussion of intercultural cinema, where 
‘intercultural’ is understood as an interstitial position between one or more cultures, 
Marks argues that cinema’s haptic qualities can speak for those whose experiences are 
absent from recorded history and visual archive. She positions cinema’s affect as 
beyond codes, as uncensored sensation, rather than cultural sensibility. Marks sees 
this as crucial to intercultural cinema as a mode of address that can speak from 
positions of marginality, foregrounding identity as a process rather than a position. As 
a genre, the golden age Hollywood musical is far removed from such marginal or 
intercultural concerns, representing instead one of the studio system’s most mass 
produced and mass-consumed forms of entertainment. Dancer in the Dark, however, 
foregrounds ideas of both the haptic and the intercultural through the figure of Selma 
– a myopic, immigrant factory worker who loves and lives through these Hollywood 
musicals.6   
In order to understand the musical as a commodified utopia and see how this 
is challenged by Dancer in the Dark, it is helpful to elaborate Dyer’s original 
argument further and establish some of the paradigmatic conventions of the 
Hollywood musical. In Entertainment and Utopia, Dyer argues that musicals do not 
present models of utopian worlds, do not show specific idealistic alternatives, rather 
“utopianism is contained in the feelings it [the musical] embodies”.7 For Dyer, these 





representational signs - signs that do not signify in figurative terms - such as “colour, 
texture, movement, rhythm, melody, camerawork”. It is the non-representational 
signs, rather than representational narrative or characters, which are crucial to the 
musical’s communication of utopian feelings. Dyer positions these feelings as 
responding to real social tensions, inadequacies or absences. According to Dyer, the 
musical conveys feelings of energy, abundance, intensity, transparency and 
community which function as temporary answers to social issues of exhaustion 
through work, scarcity, dreariness, manipulation and social fragmentation. Musical 
convention typically presents these social problems in the narrative world of the film, 
only to resolve them through the formal qualities of the musical numbers. One 
example of this, among many, is Busby Berkeley and Mervyn LeRoy’s Gold Diggers 
of 1933. As cultural texts, musicals are structured by these contradictions: between 
narrative and musical number, speech and song, walking and dancing, reality and 
fantasy etc. In order to negotiate the conflicting utopian and dystopian sensibilities, 
these contradictions must be ‘managed’ by making the transitions into the musical 
register feel natural. Musicals do so, for example, by using what Dyer coins as 
‘papering-over-the-cracks devices’ such as the ‘cue for a song’, or by integrating the 
musical numbers into a narrative of the ‘backstage musical’ which provides an excuse 
for the transition into performance (e.g. Busby Berkeley and Lloyd Bacon’s 42nd 
Street, 1933). Such strategies help to mask “the gap between what is and what could 
be” and “imply that the world of the narrative is also (already) utopian”.8  
By Dyer’s standards, the musical emerges as a conservative text, consistent 
with the way it has been read by other theorists of the musical, such as Jane Feuer. 
Feuer has shown how musicals can unexpectedly be considered ‘self-reflexive’ texts 
in the way we have come to expect of more post-modern filmmaking: musicals 
demystify their own status as entertainment because they articulate the genre’s 
relationship to technology, the studio and its audience. Yet for Feuer, they remain 
conservative texts, “remythicizing” at another level, using reflexivity to “perpetuate 
rather than deconstruct the codes of the genre”.9 The Barkleys of Broadway (1949), 
Singin’ in the Rain (1952) and The Band Wagon (1953) all include examples of 
‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ performances, but Feuer demonstrates the way it is 
only the unsuccessful performances that are demystified. The successful performance 
comes to stand in for a musical performance, presenting the ultimate valorisation of 
Hollywood entertainment. Dancer in the Dark, like the Hollywood musical, is self-
reflexive in the way it both is and is about the musical. However, Dancer in the Dark 
takes this self-reflexivity further in the way it engages the body through affect and the 
non-representational to render the body consciously reflective and establish an 
intersubjective engagement with Selma. This is what I reflect on further through 
Marks and Dyer. 
Both Dyer and Marks draw on C.S. Peirce’s terminology to determine how 
non-representational signs convey meaning.10 Dyer understands the relationship 
between non-representational signs and their meaning as iconic; there is “as much 
coding in the emotions as in the signs for them”. 11  For Dyer, a viewer’s response to 
the non-representational signs is predetermined through an “affective code”, one that 
arises historically and culturally, and bears a resemblance (at the level of 
structuration) to the coding of the non-representational. Meaning arises through these 
signs because a viewer has been taught by entertainment, by the musical and by a 
socio-cultural context, how to respond to them. Marks, on the other hand, argues that 
the iconic and the symbolic always coexist with the indexical, requiring sensory 





interaction. This distinction between Dyer and Marks determines their understanding 
of affect. For Dyer, the utopian sensibility of the musical can therefore serve specific 
ideological agendas. Just as entertainment itself will define what entertainment is, so 
too does the musical provide its own definitions for the values it espouses: “once we 
have a definition of what freedom is” says Dyer “we can embrace it joyously (hence 
the political importance of utopianism) but a freedom of feeling that knows no 
definition is terrifying”.12 When Dyer stressed the affective, utopian dimension of the 
musical, he was thus conceiving of utopia as it relates to ‘wish-fulfillment’ and 
‘escape’. Here, utopia is to be understood as an ideal place where social, political and 
moral issues can be negotiated and seem to be resolved. Marks’ interstitial model of 
feeling, understanding it as sensation in the body rather than cultural sensibility, 
invites a redefinition or alternative understanding of utopia, one more closely related 
to its etymological root from the Greek ou (not) + topos (place), not an ideal place, 
but a non-place. This definition of utopia as a ‘non-place’ sets it up as a site of 
subjectivity and feeling that lies outside of ideology’s reach. 
 Dancer in the Dark certainly does provide us with a freedom of feeling that 
knows no definition. In a manner that has come to be expected from self-declared 
‘enfant terrible’ Lars von Trier, the film radically refuses to approach the musical 
genre and employ its representational strategies in a conventional way. Understood 
most simply, Dancer in the Dark is a parody or subversion of the genre. However, the 
film also provides perhaps one of the most concerted efforts to think through an 
interrogation of the musical; it not only deconstructs, but also inhabits the musical in 
an affirmative way through its recasting of musical codes in the haptic register and its 
location of utopia as non-place of sensation felt within the body of its protagonist. 
 This article will begin by discussing how one can understand Dancer in the 
Dark’s deconstruction of the musical genre, addressing the way the film handles the 
cinematic and affective codes that Dyer discusses and whether the musical conveys 
utopia through sensibility or sensation. It will then move on to consider what new 
values the musical acquires through its deconstruction and appeal to the haptic in the 
film’s form. Here, in conjunction with Marks, I draw on the work of Vivian 
Sobchack, which poses a “materialist - rather than idealist - understanding of 
aesthetics and ethics”.13 The article will ask what form of engagement with cinema 
the musical demands of us, developing Roland Barthes and Jean Luc Nancy’s 
discussions on listening and audition to show how Selma teaches us a new way of 
listening to the world and of responding to film. Finally, I will address the way 
Dancer in the Dark makes us, as ‘viewers’, feel.14 The question becomes what kind of 
utopia are we made to feel in this twenty-first-century return to the Hollywood 
musical, how are these feelings manifested and what are their implications for how 
and why we should continue to attend to the musical as a genre. 
 
Dancer in the Dark continually uses and confuses a viewer’s expectations of the 
Hollywood musical in order to disassemble it. This using and confusing is made 
explicit through Dancer in the Dark’s self-reflexive incorporation of a performance of 
The Sound of Music (Robert Wise, 1965). The choice of The Sound of Music as an 
intertext is itself interesting in the way it sets the tone for a dismantling of the genre. 
As a late musical, The Sound of Music is in some ways a knowing text, developed at a 
point where the genre was facing extinction. Part of the studio musical’s diminishing 
popularity was due to the overproduction of Broadway adaptations at the end of the 
1960s, so the extremely amateur performance staged in Dancer in the Dark (Selma is 





to the musical, from the perspective of the genre’s history. Dyer, speaking of the 1965 
Robert Wise film version, explains how the musical number ‘My Favourite Things’ 
foregrounds the importance of the non-representational in the musical genre. He 
argues: 
 
It is essentially the music that cheers, not thinking of the nice things, for 
when, later in the film (after Maria has temporarily left the von Trapps), the 
children attempt to reprise the song, the result is lugubrious, dispirited. It is 
only when Maria returns during the attempted reprise, and in her singing 
recovers the song’s bounce, that it is effective. This is because ‘My Favourite 
Things’, despite its lyrics, expresses in the way it is presented more the 
essential spontaneity and warm community of music than the comfort of nice 
thoughts.15 
 
The Sound of Music is therefore just as much, if not more, about the sound of music 
than it is about a governess and captain falling in love in Austria during the lead up to 
the Second World War. This is evidence of Feuer’s argument that the musical is a 
self-referential genre with an ultimate need to valorise itself and entertainment, to 
suggest that “life should aspire to the condition of musical performance”.16 In a 
humorous and parodic manner, Dancer in the Dark literalises (or materialises) the 
lyrics of ‘My Favourite Things’ by having each of the the favourite things brought out 
onto the stage for Selma to hold. This profound misunderstanding of the song 
converts the non-representational (value residing in the music, performance and act of 
singing) into the representational (value residing in the set of discrete objects) and 
demonstrates its failure, as Selma cannot keep up with the music. The section equally 
parodies the musical convention described as ‘bricolage’ by Feuer, who argues that 
the myth of entertainment and its valorisation depends on mediating and seemingly 
resolving the musical’s inherent contradictions through, for example, the “myth of 
spontaneity”. This myth of spontaneity is important in the musical for it masks the 
technology and elaborate calculation necessary for its complex production, making 
the musical appear to be part of nature, rather than culture. In bricolage:  
 
performers make use of props-at-hand - curtains, movie paraphernalia, 
umbrellas, furniture - to create the imaginary world of the musical 
performance. This bricolage, a hallmark of the post-Gene Kelly MGM 
musical, creates yet another contradiction: an effect of spontaneous realism is 
achieved through simulation.17 
 
Rather than Selma’s props having their calculated place on stage and reason for being 
there, Kathy is seen clumsily appearing from off-stage, handing Selma bright copper 
kettles and warm woolen mittens. The performance is stripped of the myth of 
spontaneity, demystifying the musical as life tries and fails to approximate the 
condition of musical performance. What is revealed instead is the simulation musicals 
depend on and the contradictions that they negotiate and bridge. In the musical 
numbers, props-at-hand do make an appearance, but not in a way that can be seen to 
correspond to Feuer’s concept of bricolage. In the musical number ‘Cvalda’, fellow 
factory workers dance with machines, brooms, carts and levers. Yet, the transition 
into a wholly contrasting visual aesthetic for the musical number makes these props-
at-hand hard to recognise and accept as part of the diegetic world of the film, 





If the musical is, as Feuer argues, a drive to overcome difference and mediate 
such contradictions between narrative and musical number, Dancer in the Dark’s 
refusal to do so could be seen as the film’s most formally subversive aspect. The 
musical numbers of Selma’s inner world do employ the same non-representational 
qualities (of colour, of camerawork etc.) as the Hollywood musical and, in doing so, 
the musical numbers also convey similar joyous feelings of energy, abundance, 
intensity, transparency and community. However, Dancer in the Dark makes no 
attempt to reconcile the aesthetic disjunction between the static camera, fragmentary 
editing and colourful artificiality of the musical numbers and the saturated colours, 
natural lighting and handheld camera of the narrative. Patricia Pisters, who employs a 
Deleuzian approach in her reading of Dancer in the Dark, looks specifically at the 
aesthetic contrasts between narrative and musical number, arguing that each musical 
scene begins with a “degree zero in which the rhythm and nature of the images starts 
to change and then transport us into another world”.18 This could suggest that Dancer 
in the Dark does mediate its contradictions through this ‘degree zero’, employing 
what Dyer called a ‘papering-over-the-cracks device’. However, Pisters goes on to 
suggest that these contrasts, though mediated by these degree zero moments, structure 
the film as a whole and create a “dialectical structure of oppositions”. 
That these oppositions are not overcome, means that the non-representational 
cannot be considered iconic in the way Dyer suggests. It is the coding of emotion, the 
affective code of sensibility, which allows the non-representational qualities of the 
musical to be considered iconic. Dyer sees their logic of resemblance residing not 
necessarily in appearance but at “the level of basic structuration”.19 Dancer in the 
Dark however, refuses to submit to coding the non-representational and reflects this 
resistance formally by allowing its musical numbers to swing, appendage-like, about 
the narrative body, violating a viewer’s expectations of traditional cinematic code. 
While the viewer may therefore recognise the non-representational ingredients in 
Dancer in the Dark, they lack both the affective and cinematic coding required to 
stabilise their meanings. 
 Dancer in the Dark’s affect without code, or rather, its alternative code, means 
that, contrary to the Hollywood musical, Dancer in the Dark explicitly draws 
attention to the gap between “what is and what could be” that Hollywood musicals 
usually overcome  through mediating the oppositions between narrative and musical 
number.20 The utopian feelings of the musical world are structured by an 
insurmountable difference that suggest this world is at a fundamental distance from 
the world of the narrative. In drawing attention to this gap, Dancer in the Dark undoes 
the suture that Hollywood musicals depend on to function as ideological products, 
thus working against the musical as a commodified utopia where “entertainment 
provides alternatives to capitalism which will be provided by capitalism”.21  
Les Parapluies de Cherbourg/The Umbrellas of Cherbourg (Jacques Demy, 
1964) is another example of a musical from the post-classical era that deliberately 
fails to manage this distinction in order to destabilise the way the non-representational 
functions. Demy’s narrative is subsumed entirely by the musical form. Rather than it 
feeling as though the musical world has taken over reality however, it feels as if 
reality has instead hijacked the musical world. Naturalistic dialogue as well as the 
beautiful protagonist’s (Catherine Deneuve) melancholy and indifference, insinuate 
themselves into the great orchestral numbers to undercut the non-representational and 
sap it of its bounce.22 
 Dancer in the Dark, however, still uses the musical to express what utopia 





representational narrative (that posits a problem), and non-representational musical 
numbers (that provide escape or resolution). As a viewer, we require a different mode 
of sense-making to understand its code.  
 Selma’s blindness allows for a formal exploration of embodiment that Marks 
sees as privileged in its ability to approach intercultural experience. The film’s 
articulation of the relation between blindness and the exilic allows us to revisit the 
musical from a “non-fetishizing form of looking, one that invites the “viewer” to 
experience the object not so much visually as through bodily contact”.23 Selma’s 
bodily engagement speaks to the structures of feeling inherent in the musical, as 
discussed by Dyer, though in a way that reveals the musical as at once an object and 
an experience open to engagement, where meaning remains dialogic, and sensation, 
un-coded. The musical not only provides Selma with an escape, it gives her a site of 
resistance against the Hollywood musical’s hegemony: through coming into contact 
with the musical in a way that moves beyond the representational and the visual, 
Selma’s “sense-ability” allows her to transcend and subvert the utopic sensibility of 
the musical.24 Just as Selma goes beyond the musical as cultural object, von Trier’s 
musical too exceeds its Hollywood frame. He employs Hollywood’s conventional 
2.35:1 aspect ratio, yet it struggles to contain the aesthetic excess and mess of 
sensation brought to us through Selma. Instead, the aspect ratio’s panoramic 
proportions are graphically matched by the surveillance slit on the door to Selma’s 
prison cell as she waits to be taken to the gallows, drawing an uncomfortable link 
between Hollywood’s scopic economy and other regimes of surveillance and power. 
While the film thus speaks from within hegemonic frameworks, employing the 
musical genre as a frame and parodying musical convention from within this frame, 
von Trier also subverts the musical by giving us new frames: Selma’s blurred, myopic 
ones. It is through this intimate, haptic engagement with the musical - one that 
acknowledges both its materiality and its material presence - that we may begin to 
understand what utopia really feels like. 
 
The viewer-auditor senses in Dancer in the Dark through the film’s appeal to non-
visual knowledge. Britta H. Sjogren, in her work on the female voice, examines the 
way Dancer in the Dark breaks away from a scopic economy by effecting a 
spectatorial relationship with Selma that “detaches her from the gaze” while her 
(Björk’s) voice opens out onto another realm of perception.25 My argument wishes to 
build on this to suggest that von Trier’s camera too succeeds in emulating other 
realms of perception. The camera often frames Selma’s face from such close-up 
proximity that we see it only partially, the frame excluding parts that would make the 
image of a face seem ‘complete’ or ‘whole’ in the way we are accustomed. This 
resonates with Gilles Deleuze’s discussion of visagéité (faciality) and Béla Balász’s 
discussion of the close-up that Marks herself builds on in developing the concept of 
haptic visuality. Deleuze argues that all close-ups are a face (or ‘faceify’ their object) 
for they create an intensification of affect within the image: “It is this combination of 
a reflecting, immobile unity and of intensive expressive movements which constitutes 
the affect […] each time we discover these two poles in something we can say it has 
been treated as a face […] and in turn it stares at us”.26 Selma’s face in close-up, by 
exceeding the frame, goes beyond what the frame can comprehend and so, through 
the close-up’s rebellion against the frame, Selma does defiantly stare back. In making 
part of the image invisible to the viewer, von Trier makes visible something else, 
what Balász explains as the close-up’s ability to engage with the “dramatic 





of close-ups on Selma’s face functions as a means of abstraction, one that bears 
witness to the invisible condition of her sight. It confronts the viewer with what lies 
beneath the surface by involving them in the image with a new kind of intimacy, 
bringing them into contact with Selma’s eyes as wounds that do not look back. The 
close-up reveals simultaneously Selma’s blindness and our own, as it forces us to 
confront her illegibility. The viewer is thus made to understand the flesh, as Steven 
Shaviro argues, as at once cinema’s “subject, substance and limit”.28    
 This appeal to non-visual knowledge becomes essential when it comes to the 
musical numbers themselves. Another means by which von Trier uses non-
representational signs in order to create a haptic, embodied image and sound is 
through his use of one-hundred cameras to shoot the dance sequences from many 
possible angles. This allows the moving bodies to pass freely through the space, rather 
than being trapped by a camera that captures them within the frame and contains their 
movement for a viewer’s visual pleasure. The hundred-camera strategy evokes what 
Patrick Heelan has termed a “hyperbolic version of space”, as opposed to its 
alternative, the culturally-normative Euclidean visual space that has dominated from 
the Renaissance. In hyperbolic space, the subject:  
 
must…use the rule of congruence which…is embodied in the capacity of the 
unaided visual system to order the sizes, depths and distances of all objects in 
the unified spatial field of vision.29 
 
Hyperbolic space, Sobchack explains referencing Heelen, is the “curved space of our 
lived and embodied experience” whereas Euclidean space is our perception of space 
as it is conditioned by maps and signs; the geometrical systems that make it 
universally intelligible.30 The freely moving bodies in von Trier’s musical numbers 
are liberated in this embodied, hyperbolic version of space. Instead of providing 
scopic mastery, the space is made less intelligible for the viewer as it fails to be 
plotted along Cartesian lines and tracking shots, or according to cinematic continuity-
logic. Instead, we must orientate ourselves in relation to these other bodies that 
function as ever-shifting subjective signposts.  
 Though it is the musical numbers that most overtly engage with Selma’s 
musical reinvention of the world around her and present us with access to her 
embodied existence, the movement of the camera that films the narrative equally 
appeals to forms of non-visual knowledge. Its handheld, unstable nature bestows an 
embodied, human presence behind the image. The camera often seems to follow aural 
cues rather than visual ones. Contrary to Vertov’s “cine-eye”, von Trier’s camera 
functions as a ‘cine-ear’.31 On a basic level, this happens when people speak; the 
camera pivots round to follow the sound of a voice, rather than cutting to and setting 
up the image for the next line of dialogue. However, the camera also follows non-
verbal cues. For example, when Selma agrees to take on the night shift in the factory 
and Kathy turns up to help her, the viewer hears Kathy’s clatter, foregrounded by the 
sound editing, as she picks up the metal sink from the factory machine. Selma turns 
her head and the camera cuts to the sound source where the image then reveals the 
source of the noise. By hearing Kathy first, the viewer is made to live acoustically and 
experience space aurally alongside Selma’s subjectivity. Von Trier’s camera 
movement is guided by the hierarchy of Selma’s own sensory organisation.  
 Marks makes a distinction between aural signs and aural textures which she 






Of course we cannot literally touch sound with our ears, just as we cannot 
touch images with our eyes; but as vision can be optical or haptic, so too can 
hearing perceive the environment in a more or less instrumental way. We 
listen for specific things, while we hear ambient sounds as an undifferentiated 
whole.”32 
 
Selma’s attention to the haptic, aural textures that surround her become the viewer’s 
cues for entering into the haptic visuality of the musical numbers, passing through the 
different strata of the film’s diegesis. Marks claims that in settings such as nightclubs 
or construction sites) “the aural boundaries between body and world may feel 
indistinct”.33 Dancer in the Dark emphasises this blurring boundary by always 
identifying the diegetic sound source (such as the scribbling of pencils) that provokes 
the aural texture created through Selma’s bodily imagination.  
 Selma’s ability to create these aural textures, as well as the camera’s attentive 
mode of existing alongside Selma as a ‘cine-ear’, suggests that Dancer in the Dark 
posits an alternative mode of listening to the musical. This provokes an exploration of 
listening as it has been theorised by Roland Barthes and Jean-Luc Nancy which 
allows us to consider the political and ethical dimensions of Dancer in the Dark’s use 
of haptic sound. Barthes argues that it is by way of rhythm that listening becomes 
creation.34 His article on listening historically charts the different forms of listening 
that have determined relations between human beings, and he ends the essay 
advocating for a new form of listening, something he terms “free listening” which he 
sees as political: “freedom of listening is as necessary as freedom of speech”.35 For 
Barthes, it is “not possible to imagine a free society if we agree in advance to preserve 
within it the old modes of listening: those of the believer, the disciple, and the 
patient”.  Instead Barthes suggests a mode of listening where “what is listened to […] 
is not the advent of a signified, object of a recognition or of a deciphering, but the 
very dispersion, the shimmering of signifiers, ceaselessly restored to a listening which 
ceaselessly produces new ones from them without ever arresting their meaning”.36 
Selma demonstrates this utopian form of creative listening in her ability to convert, or 
compose, from indices and signs, aural textures. She sets the aural signs that surround 
her in motion, listening to their vibrations, and as they start to shimmer, their 
meanings destabilised, they become an aural texture.  
 It works in this way to consider the musical sequences in Dancer in the Dark 
as meta-diegetic and interstitial, pertaining to narration at one remove, rather than 
completely separate non-diegetic pieces. The musical numbers do carry the narration 
forward, such as in ‘107 Steps’ where the song facilitates the painful progress towards 
the gallows, both in narrative terms and through physical space.37 Unlike in the 
classical musical, action and progress through space are not telescoped to fit the song, 
the “logic of the real world does not give way to the logic of the song, of music”.38 
Instead, physical progress through space - the commensurate 107 steps to reach the 
gallows - actually becomes the material of the song. The musical numbers are not 
therefore mere dream-sequences where we ‘see inside Selma’s head’. They are where 
we sense, in fact, what Selma’s body feels. Barthes points out that dreams are a 
strictly visual phenomenon where any illusion of audition reaches us in the form of 
“acoustic images”.39 With Selma, von Trier is offering us the opposite: something we 
might term a ‘visual acoustics’ or even ‘visual sensation’ - Dyer’s embodied 
structures of feeling exposed at the surface. 
 Bringing these embodied structures of feeling to the surface, rendering them 





with interiority has been a point of criticism for both Barthes and Nancy.  Their 
articles on listening highlight the problematic aspects of listening’s interiority and 
associations with intimacy. Barthes argues that when we moved from a listening to 
indices to a listening to signs, listening became linked to hermeneutics, it became 
about deciphering, decoding, uncovering an “underside” to meaning. Barthes writes: 
 
The communication implied by this second listening is religious: it ligatures 
the listening subject to the world of the gods, who, as everyone knows, speak 
a language of which only a few enigmatic fragments reach men […] To listen 
is the evangelical verb par excellence: listening to the divine world is what 
faith amounts to.40 
 
For Barthes though, this religious aspect of listening is problematic, for “as soon as 
religion is internalized, what is plumbed by listening is intimacy, the heart’s secret: 
Sin.” Nancy too highlights the nature of secrecy associated with listening:  
 
After it had designated a person who listens (who spies), the word écoute 
came to designate a place where one could listen in secret. Être aux écoutes, 
“to listen in, to eavesdrop,” consisted first in being in a concealed place where 
you could surprise a conversation or a confession. Être à l’écoute, “to be 
tuned in, to be listening,” was in the vocabulary of military espionage before 
it returned, through broadcasting, to the public space, while still remaining, in 
the context of the telephone, an affair of confidences or stolen secrets.41  
 
Both Barthes and Nancy present us with a version of listening framed by its 
relationship to interiority and secrecy, one that plays into the power dynamics of 
confession and confidence. Dancer in the Dark includes examples where listening has 
gone wrong that occur within the film’s dystopic narrative. When Selma and Bill 
swap secrets, their exchange demonstrates these problematic forms of listening. 
Selma relieves Bill of his secret (that he is near bankruptcy) in a manner that Barthes 
terms the “servile listener of an inferior”, while she confesses, or rather sacrifices, her 
secret to Bill (that she is going blind), as a form of comfort and equal exchange. Bill, 
as landlord and figure of authority (representing police, law, state), listens in the mode 
of a superior and then exploits the other meanings implied by écoute, when he lies in 
wait, hidden from sight only by Selma’s blindness, visually eavesdropping to see 
where Selma keeps her savings.  
 By exteriorising the experience of listening in the musical numbers and 
presenting it as emerging carnally through the senses, rhythm experienced in the 
body, Dancer in the Dark provides alternatives to these problematic associations of 
listening. When showing the viewer the utopic sensations Selma’s body feels when 
she listens and creates music from sound, Dancer in the Dark demonstrates the 
immersive nature of sound that cuts across binary divisions of inside and outside, self 
and other. Nancy argues “sound has no hidden face; it is all in front, in back, and 
outside inside, inside-out in relation to the most general logic of presence”.42 Selma’s 
listening aims at - or is aroused by - what Nancy describes as “the one where sound 
and sense mix together and resonate in each other, or through each other”.43  
 Barthes also employs a language of externalising when describing his concept 
of “free listening”. It is when one listens to sound “in its raw and as though vertical 
signifying: by deconstructing itself, listening is externalised, it compels the subject to 





something such as a piece of classical music, where the listener is called upon to 
“decipher” by applying his cultural sensibility, his or her predetermined code. Barthes 
is arguing for a “sense-ability”, rather than sensibility, and given the political context 
in which he positions this “free listening”, thus positions it as an openness to response 
that is configured as a responsibility. Von Trier’s musical, in striving to emulate and 
make visible Selma’s listening, her material engagement with the musical, equally 
points to cinema’s own aesthetic and ethical sense-abilities, setting these up as a 
responsibility; both for cinema itself but also for spectatorship and how one engages 
with film. 
 Selma offers the viewer an immersive relationship with the world through her 
osmotic ability to transcend the boundaries between her body and her surroundings by 
using the musical form: “she can sound like a machine or a violin”.45 This is a kind of 
mimesis that depends on material contact with one’s surroundings and their sensuous 
remaking of the body. Susan Buck-Morss identifies mimesis as a way of inhabiting 
the world that anaesthetises the organism “not through numbing, but through flooding 
the senses”.46 As Selma escapes into the sensuous refuge of the musical, replete with 
the non-representational, she demonstrates not only an alternative way of inhabiting 
the world, but also implicates the viewer in an alternative relationship with cinema 
itself by demonstrating what Marks has claimed as cinema’s ability to “bring viewers 
into a mimetic relationship with the image”.47 Dancer in the Dark’s employment of 
the non-representational therefore goes beyond what Dyer identifies as the ‘stuff’ of 
the musical, beyond semiotics’ ability to convey “what utopia would feel like” to 
Marks’ assertion that “semiotic approaches cannot take into account the embodied 
nature of the cinematic viewing experience”.48 While Dyer understands the non-
representational, in Peirce’s terms, as being iconic, (“resemblance at the level of basic 
structuration”), Marks understands the non-representational as being indexical, given 
meaning by its viewer, through the mimetic, responsive interaction that requires a 
reader/viewer/feeler:  
 
Even in the most sophisticated representational systems, such as writing or 
cinema, the iconic and symbolic coexist with the indexical: representation is 
inextricable from embodiment.49  
 
Sobchack, agreeing with Marks, equally suggests that the relationship between viewer 
and screen is always indexical, referring to this relationship’s reciprocity. “The 
cinesthetic subject” she argues “both touches and is touched by the screen […] able to 
experience the movie as both here and there”, as is demonstrated in the image of 
Selma in the cinema (fig. 1).50 Yet for Sobchack, the senses’ ability to “commute 
seeing to touching” and “translate without the need of an interpreter” suggests that 
this indexical relationship is practically iconic, not because our affective emotions are 
coded, in the way Dyer argues, but because our networks of sensation are so 
immediate, volatile and synaesthetic. Selma continues to see at the cinema because 
she continues to sense. This model of spectatorship, thematised by Dancer in the 
Dark, demands that we ask how it, as a cinematic object and experience, makes us, as 
“viewers” and corporeal subject-objects, feel?     
 
While Sobchack, as I have mentioned, understands the body as having a reflexive 
relationship with the screen, she argues that it is “not consciously reflective” believing 
this would interrupt a viewer’s ability to be immersed in film.51 Yet, by drawing 





the body, our bodies, consciously reflective. Dancer in the Dark does not lay bare the 
image, but instead lays bare the image’s non-visual effects on the body, awakening us 
to the sensation and experience we bear in our bodies. 
 Rather than this conscious reflectivity standing in the way of immersion in 
Dancer in the Dark, this model of spectatorship emerges through a process that 
instead facilitates our immersion. The viewer, initially estranged by the film’s 
subversion of the musical’s cinematic codes, witnesses them as if through a distancing 
frame; not only does the first number arrive forty minutes into the film when we are 
not expecting it, the digital gaudiness of the colourful musical numbers perhaps even 
have, initially, a slightly grotesque quality to them. Yet the viewer grows more 
accustomed to Dancer in the Dark’s untethered transition from narrative to musical 
number. Through familiarity, they accept and anticipate these transitions and so more 
willingly participate in Selma’s ‘externalised interior’, her inner nervous flesh that the 
film reverses and brings to vibrate on the surface.52  
 Over the course of Dancer in the Dark, Selma’s other senses are removed and 
she becomes progressively estranged from her own body. In prison, silence reigns 
around Selma, as well as an absence of touch and smell. The viewer accompanies 
Selma in this experience. In parallel to her sensory stimuli receding, von Trier begins 
to deny his viewer the non-representational. Prison strips the world of a materiality 
Selma can engage with. Selma strains her ear to try and hear something from the air 
vent in her cell, and out of the scraps of sound emerging in silence, makes an effort to 
conjure ‘My Favourite Things’. The visual aesthetics strain to switch into the musical 
mode the film has established through its visual codes and the viewer can feel a shift, 
but the colours remain saturated, reflecting the moment’s feebleness. This process 
continues right up until the point of Selma’s execution, when von Trier pulls the rug 
from under the viewer, taking away all the ‘stuff’ of the musical, its material pile, in 
the final number, the ‘Next-to-Last Song’. The return to pure diegetic narrative for 
Dancer in the Dark’s final musical ‘number’ becomes a violent return to the scopic. 
To participate as viewers in the final scene, where Selma sings on the gallows, from 
the “other side” of the musical (without the colours, textures and the fragmented 
camerawork) is unbearable, an image the newly sentient spectator cannot tolerate in 
their body or bear witness to. Dancer in the Dark, having taught the spectator 
throughout the course of the film how to accept its revised cinematic codes and 
engage intimately with a haptic mode of viewing and listening, now thrusts its 
‘cinesthetic subject’ into a scopic position of intense realism that they no longer know 
how to distance themselves from. The viewer’s prescribed cinematic frames (Selma’s 
myopic ones) that acted as a shield from the violence of the visual and taught the 
viewer a revised model of spectatorship are suddenly absent, and so von Trier opens 
the ‘trap door’ on the spectator too, bringing them into a vertiginous relationship with 
the image in its visual brutality. 
 The viewer is thus led towards an intersubjective identification with Selma’s 
blindness: we understand her condition through our own ability to be ‘moved’ in a 
bodily manner, our awareness that we too might engage in a corporeal way not only 
with the material world, but with musicals, and beyond them, film itself. Geoffrey 
Whitehall, who offers a Foucauldian reading of Dancer in the Dark, suggests: “when 
Selma tries to create her own music on the gallows, she still dies; instead, it is the 
audience who is moved”.53 As Selma’s ability to escape into the sensuous shelter of 
the musical and slip into other authorial strata is taken away, the viewer is given the 
responsibility of continuing the ‘Next-to-Last Song’. This is achieved particularly 






They say it’s the last song/ They don’t know us you see/ It’s only the last 
song/ If we let it be 
 
Selma’s song is silenced by her execution, but also silently internalised by the viewer 
through the act of reading, and so given a new embodied site of resistance within the 
viewer. The emphasis on collectivity in these final words creates a community, yet it 
is a private one, intersubjectively constituted in the interstitial non-place between 
viewer and film, thus preserving the film’s interest in displacement and 
marginalisation. Dancer in the Dark’s haptic and intersubjective engagement is 
therefore just as subversive and political as von Trier’s deconstruction of the codes of 
musical genre because it reveals the materiality of the non-representational as volatile 
and open to resignification. The tactile dimensions of Dancer in the Dark’s form are 
thus where von Trier is most politically subversive. He takes the utopian sensibility of 
Hollywood entertainment and hands it over to the marginalised Selma, who internally 
inhabits and personalises this utopia through a complete embodied engagement with 
the musical and the structures of feeling it makes available.  
 
Despite subverting the genre, Dancer in the Dark reaffirms Dyer’s claim that the 
musical presents “what utopia would feel like”, but allows us to understand this claim 
anew. Utopia emerges as a site between diegetic and non-diegetic space, emerging as 
a non-place made of pure feeling and sensation. In Dancer in the Dark, utopia is 
sensation itself, arising through the opportunities the musical affords for a haptic 
engagement, and not from a utopian sensibility. Selma illustrates that it is only the site 
of the physical body that can give this utopia a sensate home. Whereas the Hollywood 
musical strives to create an immersive utopian illusion into which the viewer enters 
via affect, Dancer in the Dark creates an immersive relationship with which we 
interact, defetishising the musical and transforming it from object into experience.  
As well as this immersive, mimetic relationship, Dancer in the Dark reminds 
us of the musical (and cinema’s) reciprocal relationship with the viewer as a corporeal 
being, that “we bring our own personal and cultural organisation of the senses to 
cinema and cinema brings a particular organisation of the senses to us”.54 Dancer in 
the Dark makes conscious the musical’s self-reflexivity and the body’s reflectivity, 
yet rather than this preventing us from engaging and immersing in the film and its 
narrative, it creates an intersubjective space of intimacy that brings us too close to the 
material to bear the violent distance of the scopic image in Dancer in the Dark’s final 
scene. 
 This article has explored the way in which Dancer in the Dark presents a 
juncture between different areas of criticism and film that have typically been kept 
apart. This juncture produces new possibilities for engaging with the musical, its past, 
present and future. Dancer in the Dark invites us to bring in Marks’ questions of the 
haptic in relation to the musical in order to think Dyer and the haptic alongside one 
another and further explore what a haptic sound and cinema might be. The new form 
given to the musical in Dancer in the Dark engages the sense patterns of the musicals 
from the golden age in a different way, allowing us to revisit the musical’s past from 
this haptic perspective and understand its utopic affect in light of contemporary 
cinematic criticism. The potential for a haptic experience of the golden age musical 
can find traces today, for example, in the choice by Warner Bros. to restore and 





MGM’s Kiss Me Kate (George Sidney, 1953) in 2015, and The Wizard of Oz (Viktor 
Fleming, 1939) in 2013.55  
Dancer in the Dark emerged at a new historical moment for the musical, 
following the period 1980-2000 that Steven Cohan suggests was characterised by an 
intolerance towards the musical as a result of “naïve or at least unwarranted sense of 
fidelity to cinematic realism”.56 The field of post-2000 musicals saw the less-
challenged persistence of the musical within the new cinematic homes it had found 
such as animations and musical biopics.57 Meanwhile, in the musical’s European 
context there are several examples of films keen to subvert the musical form to 
negotiate its utopic and dystopic sensibilities, such as Francois Ozon’s 8 Femmes/8 
Women (2002) and Christophe Honoré’s Les Chansons d’Amour/Love Songs (2007) 
and Les Bien-aimés/Beloved (2011).  
Yet within this post-2000 field also emerged musicals apt to engage the senses 
otherwise, through the musical genre. Romance and Cigarettes (Turturro, 2005) 
employs and parodies musical conventions in order to figure intrusion and explore 
both adultery and the bodily register of the main character’s lung cancer. Jennifer 
Barker has explored the sensory synaesthetic quality achieved through camera 
movement in what she terms the “cosmic zoom” in relation to the musicals Moulin 
Rouge! (Baz Luhrmann, 2001) and Sweeney Todd (Tim Burton, 2007).58  
While I argue that Dancer in the Dark does not just deconstruct the 
Hollywood musical to dismantle the ideologies it upholds, but uses the haptic to 
engage with and inhabit the musical in an affirmative way, the haptic nature of the 
musical remains highly political and deviant. The very non-representational qualities 
of the musical that facilitate its ideological aims, as identified by Dyer, become the 
doorway and threshold through which Selma can enter the other side of the musical’s 
edifice. This is possible because Dancer in the Dark understands the non-
representational’s relationship with affect, not as coded and therefore iconic, but as 
volatile and indexical. The moving image, according to Marks, is “an emissary, which 
is volatile to the degree that the viewer/receiver has access to the materiality of its 
original scene”.59 In appropriating the iconic Hollywood musical and its material-
laden use of non-representational signs, Dancer in the Dark reveals to us the 
musical’s original volatility and renders its meanings indexical through the access the 
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